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ABSTRACT 
Muqtada al-Sadr has been one of the most influential individuals in Iraq since the 
U.S. invasion in March 2003. His Mahdi Army has actively confronted coalition forces 
and engaged in ethnic cleansing that have resulted in the displacement of thousands of 
Iraqis. This raises the question of how best to deal with this movement in order to 
stabilize Iraq. This thesis looks at the history of the Sadrist movement, explains its 
growth, and attempts to analyze means to integrate it into the political process. It borrows 
insights from the literature on how terrorism ends to make policy recommendations for 
the Iraqi government. A three-pronged economic, military, and political approach to 
channel al-Sadr into the political processes is recommended. The economic approach 
includes providing the services and welfare programs for poor urban Shia that make up 
Sadr’s constituency. The military approach includes securing Shia neighborhoods from 
insurgent activities and bombings, a critical service that has until recently has been 
provided by the Sadrists. Political integration is the final and most important element in 
the integration process. Sadr has already displayed increased interest in institutional 
politics and he could be enticed to distance himself from criminal and terrorist activity.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
What strategies should be adopted by the U.S. and Iraqi governments to channel 
the rebellious cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his Jaish al-Mahdi militia into the political 
process to strengthen stability in Iraq? The name al-Sadr is one of the most well known 
names in Iraq. It is a name synonymous with success, revival, and death. Muqtada al-Sadr 
emerged in 2003 from house arrest, where he was placed after the assassination of his 
father in 1999. His rise as a powerful military and political leader comes from the history 
behind his name and is due to the successes of his Father Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-
Sadr and his father’s cousin and mentor Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. 
Muqtada Sadr’s movement that he has successfully run stems from his father’s principles 
and ideals. By learning more about the men whose ideals have, in Sadr’s mind, 
legitimized his movement, it will help to understand what drives him and may give 
insight into his movement and the effects on the future of Iraq.  
During the years 2003 to 2007, there were thousands of violent acts each day. The 
majority of the violence was sectarian in nature causing such great fear in citizens that 
many fled their homes in search of safer areas. Al-Sadr’s militia was involved in much of 
the violent acts in areas such as Sadr City, Najaf, Basra, and Amarah, initially as 
protectors of the poor Shia and providing security to the cities. As months passed, some 
of the less loyal militiamen became more involved in crime and extortion. The people 
who once supported al-Sadr and his militia were now beginning to fear them and those 
who could flee did. Near the summer of 2007, support for al-Sadr was fading and he 
knew he must adhere to the ceasefire, to end the violence and squash the fear.  
Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army have been involved in the majority of 
conflict with the coalition forces with the exception of the fighting in al-Anbar Province 
and Fallujah, although al-Sadr did give the Sunni some support in 2004 during the 
bloodiest fighting. The fighting in Najaf in 2004 was the biggest battle in which coalition 
troops and the Mahdi Army engaged. The fighting ended with a truce but the Mahdi 
Army called it a success because they were able to hold off the larger, more technically 
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advanced U.S. troops. This gave a huge boost to the morale of the fighters and increased 
recruitment. The author believes that al-Sadr has realized after years of conflict that it has 
not achieved anything; the United States are still in Iraq, the country is still unstable, and 
he has lost much of his support. Therefore, he is becoming more political. He is 
beginning to think more like his father and cousin in that neither were very violent yet 
were able to achieve greatness. Al-Sadr understands that the time for violence is behind 
him and his movement.  
The World Health Organization estimated that more than 150,000 Iraqis died 
from violence between March 2003 and June 2006.1 Much of the violence suffered was 
sectarian strife from both the Shia and Sunni. The violence resulted from the U.S. 
invasion as the struggle for power ensued. Al-Sadr was a part of the violence as the 
Mahdi Army was formed and began to remove Sunni from predominantly Shia areas 
especially within Sadr City. The author believes that in al-Sadr’s mind, this was a more a 
move for security purposes than to cleanse Iraq of all Sunni. Like his father, he was a 
nationalist and believed that all Iraqis could live in cohesion although his actions were at 
times contradictory.  
His father and cousin were both martyred after which their followings grew and 
their movements continued. If al-Sadr had been assassinated in 2004, it is difficult to say 
what the fallout may have been but the author believes there would have been much more 
violence as a result of his death than was suffered while alive. During the tumultuous 
times of 2003-2007, to have martyred a third al-Sadr would have been disastrous.   
Grand Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr was very outspoken against the Baath regime and 
paid the ultimate price with his execution in April 1980 shortly before Saddam Hussein 
ordered the invasion of Iran. Along with a few other Shia clerics, he wanted an equal 
society. They formed the Dawa party in 1958 beginning Shia politics in Iraq. Baqir al-
Sadr’s political involvement was the inspiration for Muqtada to enter the political arena 
although with some urging by Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani. Baqir al-Sadr was never a 
 
1 Emma Ross and Fadela Chaib, “New Study Estimates 151,000 Violent Iraqi Deaths since 2003 
Invasion,” World Health Organization, January 9, 2008, 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2008/pr02/en/index.html (accessed May 12, 2009).  
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violent man but believed strongly in his opposition to the Baath government. Like Baqir 
al-Sadr, Muqtada has not personally run for any position in government choosing instead 
to pull the strings of his party. He has been influential using his militia and threats of 
violence, although Baqir did not have a militia. He had something Muqtada does not, 
Grand Ayatollah status, which seems to be much more influential than violence.  
Ayatollah Sadiq al-Sadr has been the most influential person in Muqtada’s life. 
Sadiq al-Sadr did not rise to power but was instead placed in that position ironically by 
the man he hated most, Saddam Hussein. After spending much of the 1980s under house 
arrest, he was made the spiritual leader of the Shia after the end of the Shia uprising in 
1992. Saddam selected him because of his name and because he thought he could control 
him. Sadiq was a smart man who issued fatwas in such a manner that they never appeared 
to be disloyal to Hussein. After a few years, he was able to distance himself from Hussein 
and began to be much more outspoken against the regime to the point that Hussein felt 
the need to have him assassinated to avert another Shia uprising. With Hussein gone, the 
United States became the regime that Muqtada al-Sadr would be most outspoken against 
and oppose at every opportunity. He implemented many of his father’s policies and 
fatwas. Al-Sadr has been much more violent than his father and cousin were but that 
could be attributed to the increased violence against the Shia and the United States  
Since the conflict in Iraq has begun, the violence within the country has been 
remarkable yet has not diminished the restructuring effort in the country. The first few 
years saw a lot of sectarian violence, violence between all factions and the United States 
and coalition forces, and even within factions. It should not have been a surprise when 
the largest sect, the Shia, did not agree on how the country should be administered now 
that Saddam Hussein and the Baath party had been abolished. Muqtada al-Sadr leads the 
Sadrists. He is the only major party leader to have not fled Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war 
in the 1980s. The Dawa party leader, Nuri al-Maliki, fled to Iran and Syria and the ISCI 
leader, al-Hakim, fled to Iran where he formed the party from individuals who were once 
loyal to the Dawa party. Al-Sadr has voiced his opposition to the other parties because of 
what he views as disloyalty to Iraq and the Iraqi people for fleeing to save their own lives 
instead of staying to fight.  
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Since the outset of the Iraq conflict, al-Sadr has been so outspoken and opposed to 
the U.S. presence that numerous arrest warrants have been issued for him. He has been 
targeted by U.S. raids, and the Iraqi government has planned and executed missions 
against him and his militia. However, is he a terrorist or simply a loyalist to Iraq who 
believes so strongly in his convictions that violence seemed to be the best avenue to 
achieving his goals? It could also be asked how much of the violence carried out in his 
name was actually ordered by him. Al-Sadr has been and will continue to be a very 
influential person in Iraq and the Middle East region.  
Many of the scholars who have written about Muqtada al-Sadr and his movement 
mention his mentors Baqir and Sadiq al-Sadr as influential in Muqtada’s Islamic views. 
Journalist Patrick Cockburn in an authoritative book about Muqtada al-Sadr, dedicated 
three chapters to Ayatollah’s Baqir and Sadiq al-Sadr. He wrote about the influence their 
lives and deaths had on Muqtada and how it led to his rise.2 Al-Sadr’s actions and the 
policies he enforces are indicative of his father although with some exceptions; his father 
was set against any interaction with Iran while al-Sadr accepts assistance. His father did 
not seek assistance from al-Sistani yet al-Sadr has needed his assistance numerous 
times.3
 
The biggest fundamental reason for Muqtada’s required assistance from al-Sistani 
and Iran is that he is not an Ayatollah and his credentials as a Muslim leader have been 
questioned.  
Many other sources were referenced as the author researched Muqtada al-Sadr’s 
past and his lineage. Since the conflict began in 2003, hundreds of articles have been 
published that examine how the fighting has progressed. Of the articles, none of them 
examined how to demilitarize al-Sadr. The main topic of discussion was his propensity to 
engage in violence to achieve his goals.  
When examining recent events in Iraq, the author relied on news articles from 
reputable news agencies. He has found few scholarly works published within the last year 
focusing on al-Sadr since he has been out of the public eye so long.   
 
2 Patrick Cockburn, Muqtada, Muqtada Al-Sadr, The Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq (New 
York: Scribner, 2008), 27. 
3 Ibid., 9.  
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Cockburn dedicates one chapter to describing Baqir al-Sadr and two chapters of 
the book to depict Sadiq al-Sadr, in the author’s opinion, because he understood how 
important they were to al-Sadr and the success his movement has received. The book 
portrays both Baqir and Sadiq as very non-secular and greatly opposed to the Baath party 
specifically, Saddam Hussein. Although the Baath party is no longer in existence, al-
Sadr’s new enemy is the United States and the government being instituted, at least 
initially. The book chronologically examines al-Sadr and the influence he has had on Iraq 
and the changes in Iraq on him. He describes the battle in Najaf in 2004 to some detail, 
his rise to politics, and the effects the surge had on Iraq. The book was published in early 
2008, and thus, does not cover the lull in violence since the 2007 ceasefire. He ends his 
book by stating that the only way the Sunni could feel confident that Muqtada truly wants 
unity within Iraq would be if the Mahdi Army and Sadrists were to withdraw voluntarily 
to Baghdad but he did not see this happening.4 The author thinks he would be surprised 
with the resolve the Sadrists have displayed since the Shia targeted attacks in April and 
May.  
Baqir al-Sadr’s legacy was discussed by Rodger Shanahan who examined the 
Dawa party started with great support from Baqir al-Sadr 19585 in Karbala.6 The Dawa 
party gave rise to Shia Political Islam. In the 1960s, Baqir, due to increasing pressure 
from the Marji’iyya, began to distance himself from the party because the “issue of 
divided loyalties and authority between the party and the Marji’iyya escalated.”7 He had 
the charisma that people flocked to and was able to amass the Shia population to resist 
the government. As a Grand Ayatollah, he earned an enormous amount of respect and 
influence. His influence, close ties to Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini, and his open 
opposition to Saddam Hussein on the eve of war are what led to his execution in 1980.8 
 
4 Cockburn, Muqtada, Muqtada Al-Sadr, The Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq, 204.  
5 Rodger Shanahan, “Shi’a Political Development in Iraq: The Case of the Islamic Da’wa Party,” 
Third World Quarterly 25, no. 5 (2004): 943-954.  
6 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2007), 27.  
7 Ibid., 28.  
8 Shanahan, “Shi’a Political Development in Iraq: The Case of the Islamic Da’wa Party,” 945.  
 6
                                                
Ali A. Allawi, the former Minister of Finance, Defense, and Trade of Iraq, 
published an in depth look at the conflict in Iraq from before the invasion through the 
2005 elections. He does not focus on any one aspect of the conflict but instead examines 
each area from the invasion, to the political growth, and the militias, and emerging 
political leaders. He discusses the Shia militias and the problems Muqtada al-Sadr caused 
for the interim government and Ambassador Paul L. Bremer in 2003-2004.   
Many scholars have researched terrorist groups and how they incite fear into a 
society to meet their intended goals, but only a few authors have focused on how the 
terrorist groups actually end. Two well-researched readings in how the groups end were 
an article published by the RAND Corporation and a book written by Audrey Kurth 
Cronin. The two readings focused more on how the United States can defeat Al-Qaeda 
but the principles are for any group. They each had similar results although the variables 
did differ. They each reviewed the same number of terrorist groups from that last four 
decades and although their methods differed slightly, they reached the same conclusions. 
These two readings were the main contributors used to determine if al-Sadr could be 
demilitarized. They studied over 600 terrorist groups from 1968 to 2006 examining what 
type of organization they were, what they were fighting for, and how they were 
defeated.9 Politics was one of the ways terrorist groups end and if the U.S. and Iraqi 
governments continue to allow al-Sadr to be part of the political process, his terrorist 
tendencies will end naturally.  
Philip B. Heymann wrote another book found to be useful to determine if al-Sadr 
would continue to use violence and although he did not focus on how the groups end, he 
did identify what the groups needed to succeed. He also outlined how to counter the 
needs of terrorist groups, which would ultimately lead to their end.  
For Muqtada al-Sadr, and subsequently his militia, to be demilitarized, it is 
important to understand al-Sadr and to define his organization. During the first four years 
of the conflict in Iraq, al-Sadr’s militia behaved as an insurgency with terrorist 
tendencies, in other words, while they were certainly an insurgent group that revolted 
 
9 Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, “How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al-
Qa’ida,” RAND Corporation, 2008, 2.  
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against the United States and opposed the new government institution being developed, 
they used terrorist techniques as a means to implement their own policies. The use of 
indiscriminant tactics such as IED’s, and mortars and rockets cause considerable 
collateral damage if they even hit the intended target to begin with. Terrorist acts incite 
fear into a population, which forces people to flee from their homes, and in the case of al-
Sadr, a loss of support. It is the use of indiscriminant techniques and the targeting of non-
Shiites that the author classifies al-Sadr and his militia a terrorist organization.  
Three areas must be focused upon to demilitarize al-Sadr and his militia and 
ensure they do not return to their terrorist ways. First, Muqtada al-Sadr must be brought 
into the political arena and placed in a position that the government could benefit from 
his rising regional standing and his popularity with the Shia lower/middle classes. 
Second, the government must pay more attention to providing security to the more 
destitute Shia that have faithfully supported al-Sadr. As long as they feel threatened and 
they suffer attacks from Sunni, they will continue to seek protection from al-Sadr and his 
militia. The government must also enact laws and policies to disband all militias in Iraq, 
which will be the most difficult to enforce. Unless the Badr organization disbands, the 
Mahdi Army will not disband, and until there is no longer a threat from Sunni militias, 
neither the Badr nor Mahdi militias will disband. As security forces and the Iraqi Army 
develop, they will be able to provide better security to all citizens of Iraq allowing the 
police to root out criminal elements to include anyone apart of illegal militias.   
Lastly, the Iraqi government must take economic measures to provide services 
and welfare programs for poor urban Shia that make up Sadr’s constituency. Welfare 
programs are how al-Sadr was able to create such a large following in the first couple of 
years of the conflict. If the government were to take the programs under their control, 
they would lessen the need for al-Sadr’s welfare system.  
The author maintains that inclusion in politics is the best course of action to take 
with al-Sadr because he has already expressed increased interest by having met with most 
of the regional leaders. These meetings also fuel the author’s case since meeting with the 
neighboring leaders reinforces his standing as a legitimate figure in Iraq. He would not 
want to jeopardize his reputation through association by continuing to destabilize Iraq.  
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The neighboring countries are feeling the strain from the years of war as many 
Iraqis have fled to their countries seeking refuge and are placing a large strain on their 
economies. If the Iraqi government continues to marginalize al-Sadr, he may resume the 
violence experienced in 2004 as a means to achieve his goals thinking he has nothing to 
lose. He remains an influential figure and the author believes he could remobilize his 
militia in a matter of days.  
This thesis examines Muqtada al-Sadr’s background, where he grew up, and 
where his radical views stemmed. One chapter is dedicated to his father and cousin 
because of the immense influence they both had on him as he was growing up and 
because they were both killed when he was still relatively young. Thus, he developed a 
deep hatred not just for Saddam Hussein and the Baathists, but for any group he felt was 
trying to disrupt the Shia livelihood. The author explores the Sadrist movement and how 
it has influenced Iraq since the invasion both for good and bad. All of this information 
builds the foundation to understand al-Sadr and what is necessary to demilitarize him and 
his army. It will not be an overnight occurrence; it will take time and patience. The author 
believes al-Sadr wants peace in Iraq and also believes he wants to be apart of the 
restructuring of the country.  
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II.  THE SADRIST MOVEMENT  
On March 20, 2003, the United States began the invasion of Iraq, and by April 9, 
2003, Muqtada al-Sadr had resumed Friday sermons,10 which had been abolished under 
Saddam Hussein. This was a clear action that al-Sadr was making a move as leader of the 
Shia community. He even ridiculed other clerics for not taking a stand against the Baath 
regime and now the invasion force. He especially criticized the elite leader of the Shia, 
Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani. Almost immediately after the fall of Saddam, the Sadrists 
renamed the city of Saddam City to Sadr City in recognition of al-Sadr’s father Ayatollah 
Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr and placed his picture on every street corner.11 
A.  AL-SADR AFTER THE U.S. INVASION  
The Sadr II Movement after the U.S. invasion has been filled with controversy. 
Muqtada al-Sadr was the first cleric to emerge as a Shia leader after the removal of 
Saddam Hussein from power. After his father’s execution, the movement was forced 
underground and funding became very difficult. Once Saddam Hussein was removed 
from power, the movement reemerged needing to generate funds to fuel the next phase of 
the Sadr II Movement. Iran stepped in to assist with the revival assisting with weapons, 
IED materials, training, and funding even though it went against what al-Sadr’s father 
believed in and the hatred towards Iran that he himself felt. His hatred for the United 
States seemed to have necessitated his acceptance.  
When Muqtada al-Sadr emerged as a rising leader of the Shia people, it was his 
father’s followers and supporters who supported him in an effort to revive the Sadr II 
Movement. Like his father, he instituted welfare programs to assist the poor Shia and he 
inspired them with his anti-American rhetoric. A very deep hatred still exists for America 
from the 1990s because of the economic sanctions and devastation they caused. Although  
 
 
10 Timothy Haugh, MAJ USAF, “The Sadr II Movement: An Organizational Fight for Legitimacy 
within the Iraqi Shi’a Community,” Strategic Insights IV, no. 5 (May 2005): 4. 
11 Ibid., 4. 
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much of the blame for the deaths of thousands of Iraqis was placed on Saddam for not 
distributing funds to support all Iraqis, they still blamed the United States for not seeing 
what the sanctions were doing to the country.  
Muqtada al-Sadr differed from his father in his seriousness about what he was to 
achieve. When he spoke, it was with a matter of fact attitude; there was little room in his 
life for jokes or light-heartedness.12 He was always about the business of repelling the 
Americans from Iraq and taking the country back. He carried resentment for al-Sistani 
because, like his father, he saw him as a Quietist, but because al-Sistani had a larger 
following and was more revered, he often relied upon him. His father did not agree with 
the religious figures of Iran and despised the al-Hakim family for fleeing to Iran when the 
Shia uprising in 1991 and 1992 was in need of leaders. Muqtada al-Sadr shares the same 
hatred for clergy of Iranian decent and any leader who fled when times were tough.   
Al-Sadr’s legitimacy as the leader of the Sadrists comes from Ayatollah Kazim al-
Hai’ri, who al-Sadr technically represents in Iraq.13 It is ironic that al-Sadr would have 
such strong ties to Iran, that al-Sadr would let it be known that he represents a cleric who 
fled Iraq to Iran since he believes that no Iraqi should be spoken for by someone who is 
not Iraqi (al-Sistani, who is of Iranian decent) and that Iraqi clerics who fled Iraq 
abrogated their responsibilities.14 He receives much of his legitimacy through Grand 
Ayatollah Kazim al-Hai’ri. Since al-Sadr has not achieved Ayatollah status, he needs al-
Hai'ri. He has received funding, weapons, and at times, political support from Iran while 
at the same time he criticizes other parties, such as ISCI, for their Iranian support.15 
As a representative of a Grand Ayatollah, al-Sadr has been recognized as a 
legitimate clerical leader in Iraq. The author believes al-Sadr made an exception with al-
Hai’ri because he wanted to lead the movement and he needed al-Hai’ri’s blessing as the 
 
12 Cockburn, Muqtada, Muqtada Al-Sadr, The Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq, 117.  
13 Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and Other Means,” Combating 
Terrorism Center, October 13, 2008, 30.  
14 Haugh, “The Sadr II Movement: An Organizational Fight for Legitimacy within the Iraqi Shi’a 
Community,” 3.  
15 Kenneth Katzman, “Iran’s Activities and Influence in Iraq,” Congressional Research Service, 
August 22, 2008, 1-2.  
 11
                                                
appointed leader of the Sadrists to give him the legitimacy to issue orders and make 
decisions on behalf of the movement. Al-Sadr had already been leading the Sadr 
movement from the time it went underground after his father’s death, to when the war 
broke out. When the movement resurfaced, al-Sadr wasted little time mobilizing his 
followers to patrol the streets of the cities and to rally support for the Sadr movement.16 
Once the United States had officially removed Saddam from power, the Shia 
factions began to jockey for power in the now unstable country. Al-Sadr had worked to 
get the jump on the other parties. The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq 
(SCIRI), led by Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim until his assassination in August 2003, then 
by his brother Abd-al-Aziz al-Hakim, and the Dawa party led by al-Ja’afari, had to play 
catch up to try and gain support, which they did but it was their cooperation with the 
United States that worked in their favor.17 
In the early days of the war, al-Sadr was simply a thug who took the opportunity 
after the fall of Saddam’s regime to fill the void. He and a group of young Imams from 
around Iraq, by invoking Sadiq al-Sadr’s name, “seized control of mosques, welfare 
cent[er]s, universities and hospitals and …instituted forms of local governance.”18 As 
explained by a journalist for al-Hawza al-Natiqa, it was through satellite television that 
the Sadrist movement was born because of the Shiites’ interest in him.19 They began 
programs to help the poor Shiite communities, opened mosques, and formed a militia. 
The Sadrists formed the Jaish Al-Mahdi (JAM), to oppose the already established and 
well-trained Badr Corps of the SCIRI party and defend Sadr interests.  
The Badr Corps is 25,000-strong and has years of structure since its establishment 
in 1982. All of the members received their training and funding from Iran where the 
SCIRI party had formed after its founders fled Iraq in the early years of the Iran-Iraq 
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War. The 10,000-strong Mahdi Army is much less structured and does not possess the 
discipline of the Badr Corps. Both organizations continue to receive a great deal of aid, 
training, and finance from Tehran;20 again, Sadr taking aid from the very same 
government he has condemned.   
While the SCIRI and Dawa organizations were cooperating with the United 
States, al-Sadr and the Sadrists were being very outspoken against the U.S. forces in Iraq 
and anyone who cooperated with them and continuing to do so today. After increased 
violence and continued rhetoric against the United States, the U.S. viceroy L. Paul 
Bremer on March 28, 2004, closed the Al Hawza newspaper for printing a sermon from 
al-Sadr that had praised the 9/11 attacks.21 This move marked the start of the most 
violent opposition al-Sadr would unleash on the coalition forces. Soon after Bremer 
arrived in Iraq, he began to focus greatly on al-Sadr and his militia. He spent a lot of time 
tracking him and ordering attacks against 
In early April 2004, Bremer had al-Sadr’s top-aide, Mustafa al-Yaqubi, arrested 
which enraged al-Sadr so he called for an all out demonstration from his supporters with 
weapons to resist the coalition.23
 
This move by Bremer was the last straw for al-Sadr so 
in April 2004 he ordered what would be the first large-scale fight between the Sadrists 
and coalition troops. The battle occurred in Najaf and it was deemed a success by the 
Sadrists because their small army was able to hold off the technologically advanced and 
better armed U.S. Army. Although the Sadrists were able to prevent complete defeat by 
the United States, ultimately, it was al-Sistani who negotiated the end of the fighting. 
Thus, it was not the Sadrists who were the true winners of the battle in Najaf, who were, 
as Cockburn describes, al-Sadr’s opposition, Sistani, SCIRI, and the hawza.24 The 
ceasefire in Najaf gave al-Sistani the power to appoint any group to secure the city and  
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the shrines; it was SCIRI that was given that honor. With the 2005 elections fast 
approaching, SCIRI took advantage of the occupation of Najaf by moving members of 
the Badr Corps into the city who began campaigning for SCIRI support.   
Over the course of the next couple of years, resistance from the Sadrists and 
growing support from the Shia population continued as their anti-coalition sentiment 
grew. The Sadrists continued their opposition and hostility toward the United States, 
while at the same time, al-Sadr was seeking representation in the new government. After 
the 2004 battles in Najaf al-Sistani, as part of the ceasefire agreements, insistence ensued 
that al-Sadr enters into the political process.25 The elections in 2005 had formed an 
alliance for power between the Dawa, SCIRI, and Sadrists called the United Iraqi 
Alliance (UIA).26 al-Sadr was the driving force behind the selection of Nuri al-Maliki as 
Iraq’s Prime Minister,27 although the support they showed each other quickly 
deteriorated.  
1. Muqtada Al-Sadr the Politician   
After the standoff in Najaf in August 2004, al-Sadr began to become more 
involved in the political process at the request of al-Sistani. Al-Sadr gained a lot of 
support in his transition to politics, and by mid-2006, he had become a strong political 
figure not just within Iraq, but also with Iraq’s neighbors acquiring regional standing and 
displayed diplomatic skills during an early 2006 tour.28 
In the infancy of the movement, al-Sadr’s goal was not to be part of the political 
process put in place by the coalition as he was very anti-anything U.S. related. After 
much violence and the sidelining of the Sadrist movement by the United States and the 
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interim Iraqi government, they resorted to “new and more violent means of struggle.”29
 
The increased violence led up to the bloody battles in April and August of 2004 in Najaf. 
Up to the climax of 2004, there was much bloodshed and the Mahdi Army suffered 
hundreds of casualties. Muqtada realized the fighting and bloodshed were not getting him 
anywhere toward making a difference in Iraq so he changed his course of action.  
After the intense and deadly fighting in 2004, Sadr knew that for his movement to 
be seen as a legitimate force, he would need to conform to the new political system and 
be elected into the government, which up to this point, he had fought so hard to prevent. 
Sadr began to lose support from the large majority of the Shiite population as they grew 
tired of constant conflict and wanted to get back to some sense of normalcy within the 
country. The months of fighting emblazoned Muqtada but also taught him “violence 
could not accomplish everything, but that it could provide him recognition and 
acceptance. That was a lesson he would not forget as he gradually shifted his struggle 
toward another arena,”30 referring to politics.  
“After the 2004 crisis, Muqtada shifted gears, describing his transformation as a 
new means to reach the same goal, the end of the occupation. The Sadrist movement first 
resorted to peaceful resistance, then to armed resistance, and finally political 
resistance.”31 This is where he continues to work today although the Mahdi Army is 
changing and not for the better. Before the 2005 elections, Muqtada ordered a ceasefire to 
the fighting between his army and the coalition forces. He refrained from brazen acts of 
violence. His army continued to be a prominent force; they erected checkpoints, enforced 
social mores, patrolled neighborhoods, and engaged in social work, all the while 
continuing to conduct violent attacks against Baathist’s and coalition forces without 
claiming responsibility.32 
Once elected, he tried to make changes from within but was still met with much 
resistance. He maintained that he could call to arms his army at any time to meet the 
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threats he felt were worthy. He tried to be more legitimate by distancing himself from 
abuses and “blamed excessive violence on rogue elements and overzealous 
militants…”33
 
Al-Sadr did not change his “core principles, namely rejection of the 
occupation, foreign meddling, and Iraq’s partition.”34 Once the Sadrists were elected to 
office in the 2005 elections, “[Al-Sadr] … carefully circumscribed his movement’s 
participation to social ministries, gaining control over resources it then reallocated to key 
constituent groups.”35
 
Al-Sadr prefers his constituents hold positions that deal with the 
social security of the populace as he understands the importance of popular support i
 government.  
Sadr’s reign in government essentially ended in early 2008 when al-Maliki 
ordered the Iraqi army, with the help of U.S. and British forces, to Basra to expel the 
Mahdi Army. The Iraqi army was successful in driving the Mahdi Army back to Sadr 
City, when on May 11, 2008, they agreed to a ceasefire. This was a devastating defeat for 
al-Sadr’s army and was a huge success for the Iraqi Army. Due to the circumstances of 
the operation, it was a political defeat for the Sadrists because they were now seen as a 
terrorist organization on a national stage.36 Al-Maliki made the ultimatum to al-Sadr that 
his army was to disband and cease the violence or the Sadrists would be prohibited from 
participating in the 2009 provincial elections. Al-Sadr sav
his party from participating in the elections himself.  
Al-Sadr was very quiet in the next months only being heard during a protest he 
organized against the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) being proposed to the Iraqi 
Government.37 Al-Sadr has his own agenda in the reconstruction of Iraq and he does not 
want to work with the U.S. government to achieve his goals, nor does he want ties to the 
United States once the country has been stabilized. He has made it clear on more than one 
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vides are exactly what is occurring and there seems to be little 
anyone can do about it.  
B.  THE MAHDI ARMY  
hs, 
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occasion that he is for the nationalization of Iraq and he does not want Iraq to split down 
sectarian lines. This is what the United States wants also, but as a young democracy, it 
appears that sectarian di
Muqtada al-Sadr has been the face of the Mahdi Army since the beginning of the 
Iraq war and used it as a tool to achieve his political initiatives but the army’s political 
influence has dwindled in the past couple years and is almost non-existent now. Al-Sadr 
used his army as a means to incite fear into his opposition to try to solidify himself as a 
force in Iraq to make changes. He eventually realized that force did not return the desired 
results and when he became part of the political process, he shifted focus from the army 
to more legitimate means. Although the army has been quiet in the last six or so mont
 rekindle at any time and that fear continues to strike fear into the population.  
In the Mahdi Army’s infancy, the main agenda was to battle the coalition forces 
and to cleanse Iraq of any remnants of the Saddam Hussein regime to include the 
Baathists. They were also concerned with preventing the country from being led by 
Quietists from the Saddam era and those Imams who chose a life in exile instead of 
fighting the Saddam regime alongside Sadiq al-Sadr.38 The army began as small groups 
of Shiites spread throughout the southern cities of Iraq from Baghdad to Basra. They 
supported Imams in their respective areas who all supported Muqtada al-Sadr. In the 
beginning, no interest existed in being a part of the political system the United States had 
created so they opposed the United States and the Shiites who supported them.39 They 
were more interested in gaining support from the citiz
luded all Iraqis regardless of sectarian beliefs.   
Initially, al-Sadr used his army to provide security to Shia in areas that the Iraqi 
government and the United States were not patrolling or could not secure. While his 
 
38 “Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr: Spoiler or Stabaliser?” 9. 
39 Ibid., 7-8.  
 17
sed the majority of the IDP’s to mostly come from the areas with which he 
was cha
on” and for who al-Sadr’s lack of education made them 
feel bet
t behavior towards the United States and any person 
or group believed to support them.  
                                                
militia was providing security, they were also conspiring against U.S. forces and engaging 
troops when possible. In the first few years of the conflict, al-Sadr had a lot of support that 
seemed to dwindle as some members of his militia escalated to criminal activity and extortion 
against the Shia they had been protecting months earlier.40 This criminal activity had an 
alternate result. The people they had been charged to protect and provide security for were 
now abandoning their homes and fleeing to safer areas of Iraq or even to neighboring 
countries.41 Displaced people cited the extremist groups like Muqtada al-Sadr as the main 
culprits that cau
rged.42 
The army gained notoriety as a political influence in Najaf in 2004 when a small 
group of approximately 300 militiamen fought the better-trained and equipped U.S. 
forces only to end in a stalemate.43 This battle also sparked a sharp rise in recruitment. 
Al-Sadr gathered a group of followers who chose to leave their studies instead to pursue 
“street politics to pious educati
ter about themselves.44 
The Mahdi Army was very influential in Iraq at the beginning of the conflict 
through about August 2007 but it has been very quiet since then. In Baghdad on July 9, 
2006, al-Sadr and his army became more central in Iraq than ever before after “stepped-
up U.S.-led raids against [his] militia, and media allegations of the militia’s responsibility 
for widespread and particularly horrendous sectarian killings…”45 were reported. His 
militia has always been regarded as very influential to the successful restructuring of Iraq 
because of the extent of their violen
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The army was certainly gaining a reputation throughout Iraq but it was not a 
positive one. Their lack of support from the more elite Shia made it difficult for the army 
to procure weapons and to provide the necessary support for the citizens through 
legitimate means. The movement was seen as not having any organization and did not 
have a coherent political program. They also lacked discipline and did not always appear 
to be following the orders of al-Sadr.46 
In June 2008, al-Maliki ordered ISF into Amarah, a known weapons shipment hub 
from Iran. During the three days that forces were in the area, they seized hundreds of 
weapons and munitions. Al-Sadr called the action “a fierce attack against the Sadrist 
political movement.”47 This battle was probably the straw that broke that camel’s back 
and led to the ceasefire because it dramatically decreased the arsenal the Mahdi Army 
had at its disposal. It also helped to prove that Iran was supporting the army with 
weapons as many of the weapons seized in Amarah had Iranian markings, rockets, 
mortars, and EFP’s (Explosive Formed Projectile), in particular.48 
The conflict in Basra in early 2008 by the ISF, assisted by U.S. and British forces, 
caused al-Sadr to order the current ceasefire. On August 7, 2008, a spokesman for al-Sadr 
told a BBC News correspondent that he would call on his militiamen to stop carrying 
weapons on the streets.49 He also ordered “his militiamen to join a new religious and 
cultural wing of the movement that he is calling the Momahidoun, or ‘those who pave the 
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transition much of the army into a civilian movement to deal with “religious, social and 
cultural affairs,” and the other group would be an “armed force of experienced fighters 
labeled ‘the special companies’.”51 
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and policies.  
                                                
III.  MUQTADA AL-SADR’S LINEAGE  
Muqtada al-Sadr’s history is actually quite short. He was born the youngest of 
four sons on August 12, 1973. When he was twenty-one, he married a daughter of 
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr.52 Al-Sadr joined his father’s movement in the 1990s acting as 
security for his father and later becoming editor of the paper published by his father’s 
movement. He was not the most obvious successor to his father, and if his eldest brothers 
had not been assassinated, he would not be the leader he is today. Al-Sadr was made 
responsible for al-Thawra (later Sadr City) in Baghdad53 where he assembled numerous 
followers and many reunited with him in 2003.  
When al-Sadr’s father was assassinated, al-Sadr took the movement underground, 
and due to the close scrutiny by Saddam, was unable to reach out to many of Sadr II 
supporters until just after the U.S. invasion. While underground, he spent much of his 
time trying to understand his father and father-in-law better. While under house arrest 
from 1999 to 2003, he archived the speeches and works of his father and cousin.54 
During this period, his belief structure was realigned although he could not know when 
Saddam would fall; he obviously had a plan for when he did. After the United States 
began their invasion of Iraq in March 2003, al-Sadr emerged ready to implement his 
father’s ideals 
In al-Sadr’s nearly thirty-six years, he has witnessed a great deal of death in his 
family at the hands of Saddam Hussein and suffered great hardships created by the UN 
sanctions imposed on Iraq in 1992. His father’s mentor, Baqir al-Sadr, was executed 
when Muqtada was a teenager and his father and two eldest brothers were assassinated 
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family. Not only was he responsible for the well-being of his family, he had to be 
constantly aware of the surveillance he was under by Saddam Hussein as the last al-Sadr 
threat.55 
He knew what he would need to do to create a following of supporters and how to 
place himself at the center of the conflict. He was the first cleric to speak to the Shia in 
mass. Although the United States had removed the man that had caused so much pain in 
his life, he was not grateful. He wanted the United States out of Iraq so the Iraqis could 
rebuild and reform the government without outside assistance. When al-Sadr was asked 
what the “Sadrist Movement” meant,   
he said it was simply made up of people who followed the teachings of 
Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr... He added that in the broader sense, the 
movement included anybody who honored the “Speaking Hawza” and 
followed the teachings of Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr... Both wanted an 
Islamic society that would prepare the way for the return of the Imam 
Mehdi, the redeemer who would end the rule of tyrants and establish 
justice in the world.56 
Muqtada al-Sadr has risen from a relatively unknown cleric to become the most 
influential Shiite in Iraq. He has a long family history in Iraq stemming from his father 
Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr who was the spiritual leader of the Shiites in the 1990s. Sadiq 
al-Sadr was mentored by his cousin Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr until Baqir’s execution in 
April 1980. Both of these men were very outspoken against the government. Although 
Muqtada did not know his future father-in-law very well, since he would have only been 
about eight when Baqir was executed, he has been influenced by his beliefs. This thesis 
examines Muqtada’s two mentors and their movements as well as how Muqtada’s 
movement is similar and dissimilar to them.  
Each of the clerics lived modest lives. Baqir lived in a rented house and did not 
drive a car (although very few people did during the 1970s in Najaf); he believed it was 
important to live like his students.57 Both men died at the hands of Saddam Hussein, 
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Baqir al-Sadr in April 1980 and Sadiq al-Sadr in February 1999. They were both very 
popular, and had huge followings from the Shi’a communities, although Baqir al-Sadr’s 
popularity did not grow until after his death. Saddam feared them both; Baqir al-Sadr 
because of his close association with the Iranian clerical leader Ayatollah Khomeini and 
Sadiq al-Sadr because of his rapidly rising popularity, antagonism of the Ba’ath party, 
and the reputation of Baqir al-Sadr that led to their deaths. Saddam had feared a coup like 
the one suffered by the Shah of Iran and took action with the arrest and execution of 
Baqir al-Sadr in 1980 and subsequently Sadiq al-Sadr in 1999.58 
It is important to understand Baqir and Sadiq al-Sadr’s movements to understand 
Muqtada better. Although Baqir was less influential, his beliefs transcend into the 
movement of today. Sadiq al-Sadr was and still is by far the most influential person in 
Muqtada’s life. It is also important to understand how Muqtada al-Sadr was able to revive 
his father’s movement, the Sadr II Movement, after the fall of Saddam Hussein to 
become the most influential group in Iraq. Muqtada’s movement also differs greatly from 
his father’s and father in law’s movements in that it is not against the Baathist regime, 
and not entirely against Sunnis, but it is against the Americans and any group that 
Muqtada al-Sadr feels is not true Iraqi. The Americans in this era could be compared to 
the Baathists in the eyes of Muqtada and his followers.  
The foundation of the current movement is an awakening of Sadiq al-Sadr’s 
movement in the 1990s, which is why it still carries the same name, Sadr II Movement. 
Baqir’s movement was known as Sadr I. The biggest difference between the two 
movements was that Baqir’s was political while Sadiq’s was wholly about taking care of 
the Shia population ensuring they were treated fairly with the same advantages as the 
Sunni. Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement began as his father’s but has become a combination 
of both Sadiq’s and Baqir al-Sadr’s as he has moved more onto the political stage.  
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A.  GRAND AYATOLLAH MOHAMMAD BAQIR AL-SADR  
“If my little finger was Baathist, I would cut it off” was the response from Baqir 
al-Sadr when he was asked to submit to the Baathist government in Baghdad.59 When did 
this hatred of the Baathist government begin and how did a young Shi’a cleric come to be 
one of the most outspoken persons against the regime? His resentment came to light in 
the late 1950s while he was studying at the hawza in Najaf. Baqir al-Sadr is widely 
believed to have started the Dawa party that would come to be what he is most known for 
and would lead to his execution.  
Although the exact origin of the Dawa party is still unknown, there are three 
theories on when it was founded and by whom. The first theory is that it was formed by 
three men, Talib al-Ria’I, Sayyid Mahdi al-Hakim, and an unknown person on July 14, 
1958. The second theory is that is was formed on October 12, 1957, in accordance with 
Dawa party documents and verified by one of its leading figures, Muhammad Saleh al-
Adib. The final theory is that it was established in Najaf October 12, 1957, by eight 
clerics in the house of the leading Shi’a authority, Sayyid Mubsin al-Hakim. Months later 
in Karbala, a second meeting was held attended by the same members as the first along 
with some new member to include Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr who was credited with 
naming the party the Islamic Dawa Party.60 
The significance of when the party was established is important. If it was before 
the July 14, 1958 Revolution, it would seem it was formed “as a reaction to the influence 
and popularity of the Iraqi Communist Party. …[T]o stress that the Dawa party was 
founded before that date means that is had emerged as an objective response to the 
existing intellectual, political, and social conditions.”61 Shanahan believes it was 
established as a method for the Shi’a Muslims to express their desires in accordance with 
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the “tenets of Islam.”62 The party was formed with the assistance of the Iraqi Communist 
Party (ICP) in opposition to the growing threat of Arab Nationalism and land reforms. 
The ulama felt threatened not just legislatively but also ideologically as evidenced by the 
decline of students in the Najaf hawza from 6,000 in 1918 to about 2,000 in 1957, with 
only 326 being Iraqi.63 
The party’s goals and objectives to “restore Islam to the life of Muslims, 
government by the tolerant Shari’a, and establishment of the rule of God on Earth as a 
final goal”64 outlined four stages to attain the above goals. Stage one was the 
“transformative phase inspired by the form of struggle waged to change the community. 
Two was the political phase that implies political struggle against the enemies of Islam. 
Three was the seizure of power that implies the struggle to lead the community. The final 
phase [wa]s the struggle for the party to apply Islam in part of the community and 
eventually [throughout] the entire community.”65 
The first phase was performed underground and lasted 22 years until the Islamic 
revolution in Iran in June 1979 when the party moved on to the second phase. Although 
the party had not openly released the name of their movement, they were active in the 
1960s and 1970s through violent action against the government and educating the 
community through articles in their illegal newspaper, Sawt al-Da’wa, which was widely 
distributed on the campuses of Baghdad University.66 The party had received enough 
focus that in 1971, the new Saddam Hussein regime had staged a move to liquidate the 
party beginning with the arrest of Baqir. He was shortly released, but others would not be 
so lucky. In 1973, a leading party figure was executed, and in 1974, another prominent 
member and four of his associates were arrested and later executed.67 
 
62 Shanahan, “Shi’a Political Development in Iraq: The Case of the Islamic Da’wa Party,” 944. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Al-Ruhaimi, “The Da’Wa Islamic Party: Origins, Actors and Ideology,” 153. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 155. 
67 Ibid.  
 26
                                                
Following the one-day arrest of Baqir in 1979, the Dawa party moved on to phase 
two, which was a violent and deadly phase. Al-Sadr ordered military operations against 
government officials and organs of repression. He confirmed the need to take up arms 
and to overthrow the government.68 On March 30, 1980, the Revolution Command 
Council (RCC) made it illegal to be a member of the Dawa party and any violation would 
be punishable by death. In April 1980, Baqir and his sister were arrested and executed 
five days later. In September of the same year, the Iran-Iraq War broke out as a result of 
attacks by Saddam Hussein on Iran. The Dawa party members were very angry about the 
recent developments and stepped up their attacks on the government resulting in brutal 
retaliation. The majority of the remaining party members fled to Iran where the party 
leadership continued their rhetoric.69 Over the course of the war, the party began to 
identify itself more with Iran. The party staged coup attempts and assassination attempts 
on the president of Iraq without success. They also took part in much of the fighting in 
Iraq.70 
Although the party was established by clerics, it was not universally accepted by 
most of the religious leaders in Iraq. They “were opposed to any political Islamic 
activism in general, and to any organized partisan activity in particular. Popular quarters 
viewed political activism as a departure from Shi’a Islam and its precepts. Any devout 
Muslim or clergyman involved in politics would be derided, excommunicated and viewed 
with suspicion.”71 Baqir al-Sadr knew he would have to sell the idea to the clergy and 
since half of the leading body was clerics and the other half elites of university and 
religious school graduates, it would be received as a worthy movement.72 
The Dawa party gave rise to Shi’a Political Islam. In the 1960s, Baqir was a 
leading mujtahid in Najaf and was inline to become the marja in the future. However, 
due to his involvement in politics, his appointment was in jeopardy. Thus, due to 
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increased pressure from the Marji’iyya, he began to distance himself from the party.73
 
Many in the hawza felt that his political activities were harmful to it and that his 
continued rhetoric in the editorials he published in the monthly journal al-Adwa 
concerned members as being detrimental to the hawza. In 1961, Baqir al-Sadr gave up his 
post in the Dawa party and his editorial in the al-Adwa.74 From 1961-1968, Baqir al-Sadr 
concentrated on the hawza, reformed the curriculum and helped to establish a college in 
Baghdad.  
In 1968, the Baathists rose to power beginning a new phase in the struggle 
between the Sunni and Shi’a. The Baathists began to limit the Shi’a power by closing 
elementary and high schools and the college in Baghdad that Baqir al-Sadr had helped to 
establish. They “confiscat[ed] the land and funds set aside for building Kufa University, 
shut down the Risalat al-Islam (the only religious journal the government allowed to be 
published at th,e time) … expel[ed] hundreds of non-Iraqi students from the hawza in 
Najaf, and issu[ed] a law [that] require[ed] Iraqis attending the hawza to join the armed 
forces.”75 This action took the Shi’a leaders by complete surprise so they began a 
campaign to protest against the Baathists by pledging support from outside Iraq but to no 
avail, which ultimately leads to the accusation of a coup by the Baathists forcing Mahdi 
al-Hakim (the marja) to be smuggled out of the country. Ayatollah Khoei became the 
Shi’a leader and refrained from taking any action against the Baath government.76 
The years that followed were filled with tragedy and contempt. The Baathists 
continued to crack down on the hawza by expelling any non-Iraqi students until Baqir al-
Sadr convinced al-Khoei to issue a hukm to students to stay in Najaf and continue their 
studies. In 1972, the Baathists went after the Dawa party. They were arrested and 
sentenced to one to five years in prison. A couple years later, seventy-five members, 
some of them religious scholars, were rounded up and sentenced. Five of the members 
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were sentenced to death and three of them ulama. To prevent further persecution of religious 
scholars for their affiliation with political parties, Sadr issued a fatwa forbidding students and 
scholars of the hawza from joining any political party. One year later, Baqir al-Sadr was 
detained and interrogated in Baghdad but was soon released.77 
In the early 1970s, Baqir al-Sadr saw how the movement was growing and the 
increased militancy against the Baathists, which he saw as an anti-Islamic government, so 
he directed the Shi’a opposition.78
 
In 1977, the Baath regime prevented the annual Shi’a 
ceremonies that commemorated Imam Husayn’s martyrdom and was determined to use 
any means possible to prevent the pilgrimage from Najaf to Karbala. This incited massive 
protests against the regime with protesters chanting antigovernment slogans. Through the 
negotiations of Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, the government agreed to lift the ban if the 
people agreed to stop the chants but the protestors refused. The Baathists arrested 
hundreds of protestors and imprisoned them. This incident was the catalyst to the split in 
the Baath party that resulted in Saddam Hussein taking power in Iraq. Baqir al-Sadr was 
now in the crosshairs of the Baathists as the organizer of the protests, not al-Hakim.   
The revolution in Iran in 1978 presented Baqir al-Sadr with another opportunity to 
move against the Baath regime. Ayatollah Khomeini’s overthrow of the Shah gave the 
Iraqi Shi’a the motivation to do the same in Iraq. Baqir al-Sadr made several political 
moves against the regime by pledging his support of Khomeini. In one message to Iran, 
he had “called on Arabs in Iran to obey the leaders of the revolution because the Islamic 
republic represented the state founded by the Prophet where people of different 
nationalities and ethnic background could live in tranquility.”79 Sadr issued a fatwa 
prohibiting Muslims from joining the Baath party or its affiliated organizations. This was 
a very dangerous move and many people feared for Baqir al-Sadr’s life.80 
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Khomeini wanted Baqir al-Sadr to lead the Shi’a movement in Iraq before the 
Iran-Iraq war to sway the Shiites to rise up against Hussein. Iran’s main focus was to 
remove Saddam from power,81 a desire Baqir shared. Khomeini issued a letter to Baqir 
al-Sadr to stay in the hawza and not to leave Iraq; a wish he never intended to disobey. 
His loyalty to the Shi’a instigated large, violent demonstrations all over Iraq. He told his 
followers to stop the demonstrations in an effort to prevent the government from cracking 
down on the movement. As he had feared, the government reacted to the protests by 
detaining hundreds of Dawa party members including Baqir al-Sadr. His detention 
sparked demonstrations and very violent ones that forced his release.   
The government now knew just how powerful he was and placed him under house 
arrest. In 1979, he was paid a visit and told to withdraw his support of Ayatollah 
Khomeini but he refused. A new mediator was sent to his home and asked him to agree to 
just one of five conditions to spare his life: “withdraw his support of Ayatollah Khomeini 
and of the Iranian regime; issue a statement supporting one of the government’s policies, 
…; issue a fatwa forbidding association with the Dawa party; revoke the fatwa the 
prohibited joining the Baath party; or be interviewed by an Iraqi of other Arab newspaper 
that was affiliated with the Iraqi regime.”82 He refused each of the requests stating, “[t]he 
only thing [he] sought in [his] life [was] to make the establishment of an Islamic 
government on earth possible.”83 Since it was to be in Iran, he was content and accepted 
his fate. Baqir al-Sadr’s fate was sealed on March 31, 1980, when the Revolutionary 
Command Council passed the law that sentenced all past and present members of the 
Dawa party to death. He was arrested on April 5, 1980. Three days later, his body was 
delivered to Sadiq al-Sadr for a secret burial and Baqir al-Sadr’s sister was never seen 
again.84 
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A new faction of the party began to break away from the party and form its own 
leadership and ideals. This party would become known as the Supreme [Council] of the 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq led by Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim on November 17, 1982.85
 
The faction had a tough time recruiting followers because it was regarded as an Iranian 
faction and not decisively pro-Iraqi. The break and flee to Iran are the biggest reasons for 
the hatred between Muqtada and the ISCI today.  
After the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War, many of the Dawa activists began to 
leave Iran for other capitals around the world. After the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 
1991, many Iraqis sought refuge in western countries. The Da’wa party left Iran to settle 
in the West where the party refined their policies and were taking into consideration the 
twists and turns experienced in Iran and other nations around the world to cope better 
with the new developments in Iraq.86 
Baqir al-Sadr has been dead for over two decades now but the party he was 
responsible for forming and empowering is still in existence. Although the party is not 
the same as it was when Baqir was alive, it is still flourishing and has become the most 
significant party in Iraq. As the oldest party still in existence in Iraq, it has weathered 
many changes to include numerous founding members fleeing to Iran, the further 
dissemination after the Iraqi invasion into Kuwait, and finally moving back to Iraq after 
the U.S. invasion in 2003 to become the leading party. It is common knowledge that 
Muqtada al-Sadr played a major role in the appointment of Nuri al-Maliki as the leader of 
the Dawa party yet receives little credit as a legitimate politician.   
The Dawa party is very dynamic and continues to grow as the situation in Iraq 
changes but it is not what Baqir al-Sadr wanted. He wanted a state like Iran, run by the 
hawza not a system based on western beliefs. He would be very pleased that the Baathists 
are no longer in power and that nationalism is growing.  
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t have been more wrong.92 
                                                
B.  AYATOLLAH MOHAMMAD SADIQ AL-SADR  
Baqir and Sadiq al-Sadr were very opposed to secular government, which 
Muqtada al-Sadr continues today.87 Before the execution of Grand Ayatollah 
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in 1980, he had taught Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr and 
graduated him as an independent scholar in 1977. Sadiq continued his studies earning 
Grand Ayatollah status that qualified him to be the leader of the Shia movement in 1992, 
although by Saddam’s appointment.88 Ayatollah Sadiq al-Sadr, or Sadr II because he is 
the second martyr, became the spiritual leader of the Shia in Iraq after the death of Grand 
Ayatollah al-Khoei in August 1992 as a way to settle the revolt of the Shia in 1990-1991 
after the conclusion of Desert Storm. He had been under house arrest for the ten years 
prior by Saddam Hussein because of his continued anti-Baathist rhetoric.89 Saddam 
chose Sadiq al-Sadr because he was Arab and if he could compel the most outspoken 
cleric to cooperate with his regime then he could control the Shia population. After the 
massacres of thousands of Shia in 1991, Saddam believed that by co-opting a member of 
the al-Sadr family, he would be able to control the Shi’s community.90 Sadiq al-Sadr was 
also selected because of his bloodline and his relationship to the Grand Ayatollah Baqir 
al-Sadr who had been martyred at the hands of Hussein’s men more than a decade 
earlier.91 Saddam thought he had Sadiq al-Sadr under his thumb, when in reality, he was 
as anti-Baathist as he could be without being too overt. Saddam also thought that because 
of his nationalist beliefs, he would be supportive of the regime in the fight against the 
United States. He could no
Unlike Baqir al-Sadr, Sadiq al-Sadr did not care about politics, he did not speak 
out against the government (at least not overtly), he did not support a political party, nor 
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did he try to gain power through a coup. He was a nationalist and regularly expressed his 
nationalist views; he believed that Sunna and Shia could live in harmony.93 He wanted to 
revive the faith among the Shia and raise the spirits of the Shia people and have them 
enjoy the same rights as the Sunni. He wanted the Shi’a to be given the same rights as the 
Sunni, to receive the same education and wealth. He created a welfare system designed to 
assist the poor Shia, to educate them, give them medical aid, food, and the other needs 
people had. He revived the Friday sermons and led them on many occasions; this was a 
big step against the Sunni regime.94 In a mosque in Kufa, he chanted “Yes, yes to Islam; 
yes, yes to the faith; no, no to injustice; no, no to Israel; no, no to America; no, no to the 
devil.”95 This was a chant against the regime but it was stated in such a way that there 
was nothing to which the regime could object.96 
“[Sadiq al-Sadr’s] response to anti-Shiite discrimination was; there is no Sunna 
and no Shia. Yes to Islamic unity! a slogan one still can see on banners adorning mosques 
with which he was associated.”97 What Saddam did not realize at the time was that Sadiq 
al-Sadr was very set in his beliefs and would not sacrifice the freedom and rights of the 
Shia for his own benefit.  
Like his cousin Baqir al-Sadr, Sadiq al-Sadr was imprisoned numerous times for 
being outspoken against the government. He was first arrested in 1972 along with his 
cousin and Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim. He was arrested again in 1974 and endured an 
immense amount of torture until his release in 1975. He was placed under house arrest 
and intently prayed so much that he damaged his health. He became so angry at the world 
that even when he would visit the Imam Ali Shrine, people would be too afraid to speak 
to him.98 
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During the 1980s, he was not as outspoken but still held great contempt for the 
government. He also began to speak out against what he called the “pacific marji’iyyah 
compared to the active or militant marji’iyyah.”99 According to Cockburn, Sadiq al-
Sadr’s plan in 1991 was to “persuade the regime that he was under its control so he could 
build a mass movement, making Shiism once more relevant to the spiritual, 
psychological, and economic needs of the faithful.”100 After Iraq invaded Kuwait and the 
United States defeated them, the U.N. placed economic sanctions on the country that 
deepened the suffering of the Shia. Although the suffering was not the U.S.’s intention, 
Sadiq al-Sadr held immense contempt for America. The impoverishment and devastation 
felt by the Shia was the catalyst Sadiq al-Sadr needed to rise up as their leader and what 
also catapulted Muqtada al-Sadr in 2003.101 
Sadiq al-Sadr was believed to be weak and controllable by the Baath regime but 
he was able to trick them. He intended to strengthen the Shiite belief by establishing a 
network of preachers and organizers and created a sort of truce with the regime to create 
more room to maneuver. When the regime offered him bodyguards, he refused stating 
that he was already considered a government agent and he did not want to damage his 
credibility as the supreme spiritual leader any further. His façade did not last long before 
Saddam began to distrust him and kept him under constant surveillance. Around 1997, he 
became much more confrontational towards the regime and suffered more and more 
restrictions.102 
Sadiq al-Sadr was unlike other clerics in that he spoke to the poor, he understood 
their hardships, and he empathized with them. When he would speak to the masses, he 
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other services. Sadiq al-Sadr amassed a following of the poor Shi’a because they were 
most in need of guidance and support and were frowned upon by the more wealthy who 
saw the poor as a threat to their interests.103 
The Sadrists sought the younger Shi’a as their supporters as the older Shi’a were 
more aligned with the Quietists like al-Sistani. The older Shi’a did not want to upset the 
order; they had money and comfort while the youth were more anti-Baathist and wanted a 
more unified state in which they could have more control. The same young Shi’a that 
followed Sadiq al-Sadr rallied behind Muqtada al-Sadr in 2003.   
Sadiq al-Sadr continued to fight for the rights of Shi’a up until his assassination in 
February 1999. He knew his death was coming, “in 1998 he began to wear a white shroud 
over his shoulders, a sign that he expected to be martyred.”104 
Along with Sadiq al-Sadr, his two eldest sons, the most likely successors, were 
also assassinated leaving Muqtada al-Sadr to continue his father’s movement under 
Grand Ayatollah Kazim al-Hai’ri who fled to Iran.105 Muqtada al-Sadr took the 
movement underground in Iraq along with much of the support his father had and still 
received assistance and legitimacy from al-Hai'ri.106 With al-Hai’ri in Iran, it was 
Muqtada al-Sadr who stayed to ensure his father did not die in vain. He was not seen as 
the threat to Saddam that his father was because he did not possess the credentials his 
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Cockburn credits Muqtada al-Sadr as being more intelligent and crafty than most 
people ever gave him credit for, and although it is true he did not go far in his religious 
studies, dropping out of the hawza to work in his father’s movement, he has been able to 
amass a large following. He published and edited the al-Hawza, a periodical started 
during his father’s movement and continued after the fall of Saddam. Even though no 
evidence exists that the Sadr II Movement did anything from Sadiq al-Sadr’s death to fall 
of Saddam Hussein, Muqtada al-Sadr was successful in keeping the movement alive and 
awakening it in April 2003.  
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IV. HOW TO DEMILITARIZE MUQTADA AL-SADR  
Since Muqtada al-Sadr emerged, he has become one of the most influential 
persons in Iraq. Since before the first days of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, he has been very 
outspoken against the U.S. presence and the only mainstream cleric who has not wavered 
in his position towards the United States. In the first few years of the operation, he 
utilized his militia to enforce his anti-U.S. rhetoric, to incite fear into the non-followers, 
but most notably to support the poor Shia of Iraq. Al-Sadr called for his army to uphold 
the August 2007 ceasefire and there has been very little violence at the hands of any of 
his followers since. He has even denounced any violence committed in his name and 
encouraged the individuals to be arrested. This continued separation from violence has 
only displayed an increased desire to become a more legitimate figure in Iraq. Al-Sadr 
maintains a very strong and loyal following, and with each passing month and year, his 
following will only continue to grow. The author has entitled this chapter with the word 
‘demilitarize’ but with that comes ‘legitimization’ as al-Sadr continues his studies with 
the goal of gaining Ayatollah status and supporting the young government from behind 
the scenes.  
Historically, Muqtada al-Sadr and his loyal following have been labeled terrorists 
and insurgents and no one can argue his actions certainly meet the criteria for such labels. 
In the author’s opinion, al-Sadr is going to continue to be a very influential figure in Iraq 
for a very long time making it very important for other nations to recognize him as a 
legitimate influence. He has already taken steps towards peace as he becomes more 
political and continues his studies in Qom, Iran but the United States can do much more 
to ensure violence is not rekindled after the withdrawal of troops from Iraq. To 
understand how to legitimize such a radical leader and the Mahdi Army that in the past 
has seemed to have no real structure and committed violent acts against anyone 
regardless of sectarian belief, it is first necessary to define the organization. As stated 
above, the organization has been defined as a terrorist group and insurgency so how does 
the United States approach the dilemma of demilitarizing them and ultimately 
legitimizing the Sadrists and the Mahdi Army?  
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A.  HOW TERRORIST GROUPS/INSURGENCIES END  
Extensive work has been done that examines terrorist groups but little work has 
been done on how they end.108 To be able to understand how the groups end, terrorism 
should first be defined. The RAND Corporation defines terrorism as: “…involv[ing] the 
use of politically motivated violence against noncombatants to cause intimidation or fear 
among a target audience,” and a terrorist group as, “a collection of individuals belonging 
to a nonstate entity that uses terrorism to achieve its objectives.”109 Before Muqtada al-
Sadr became politically involved, his organization could be considered a terrorist group 
but once he became involved in politics, he and the Ssdrists became a state entity. 
Anthony Oberschall refers to a definition by Laquer as “the use of covert violence by a 
group for political ends.”110 He continues to describe four key elements that the author 
feels are important to highlight: “(1) it is collective action, not individual; (2) it is 
political, not criminal; (3) it is covert, not conventional warfare; and (4) it is of course 
violent.”111 Audrey Cronin loosely defines it as inciting fear into the public and then 
exploiting that fear to accomplish their intended goals.112 As the above definitions 
explain, a universal definition for terrorism does not exist but seems to be more author-
defined. However, one common theme pervades, which is that it involves violence 
against civilians to incite fear usually for political means.   
There have been over six hundred terrorist groups in the last forty years and 
slightly less than half have actually ended. Of the groups still active, approximately forty 
percent are still active and twenty-one percent has moved to another area.113 The RAND 
Corporation conducted a study to analyze why terrorist groups end by examining five 
ways and Audrey Cronin evaluated why terrorist groups end to understand how Al Qaeda 
 
108 Jones and Libicki, “How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al-Qa’ida,” 1.  
109 Ibid., 3.  
110 Anthony Oberschall, “Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory,” 
Sociology Theory 22, no. 1, Theories of Terrorism: A Symposium, (March 2004): 26.  
111 Ibid., 26.  
112 Audrey Kurth Cronin, Ending Terrorism: A Strategy for Defeating Al Qaeda (Routledge, 2008), 7.  
113 Jones and Libicki, “How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al-Qa’ida,” 4, 35.  
 39
                                                
will end. Phillip Heymann outlined terrorist needs in order to survive. All three authors 
had many commonalities in their assessments to end terrorism. One of the most striking 
was to refrain from using large-scale violence against the groups. To end terrorism, the 
terrorists groups must be understood as well as ascertain what they need to survive. 
Terrorism has two purposes, “to gain supporters and coerce opponents.”114
 
Al-Sadr has 
been very accomplished in each. In the first months of the conflict, he amassed incredible 
support by supplying basic necessities to the poor Shia populations, such as food, 
electricity, blankets, and security. Once he had a large support network in place, he was 
able to use coercion to sway political decisions such as when he threatened violence if al-
Jaafari was not selected as the Prime Minister after the 2005 elections.  
Heymann approached the dilemma of how to end terrorism by analyzing what the 
terrorist groups need to survive and how to counteract those needs. He first described the 
terrorist needs as recruits; resources; training; tactical information; access; means to 
escape (does not apply to suicide bombers); a haven; hope; and social acceptance.115 To 
cutoff all of the needs above would be a very lofty effort and require immense resources 
to enforce. Taking the previous needs into consideration, it is easy to understand why the 
Sadrists were so successful in their actions until the summer of 2007 when al-Sadr 
declared the latest ceasefire. There seemed to be an endless number of Shia who wanted 
to be part of his movement and they found safe haven in a number of areas. Sadr City 
was the main haven, but so were Najaf, Basra, and Amarah. Resources in the form of 
munitions, funding, training, and even a place to escape came from their neighboring 
Shiite’s in Iran.116 Mahdi Army militiamen also found convenience in being able to 
blend into the surrounding neighborhoods making it very easy to escape after an attack on 
coalition forces. Since they were committing attacks around their safe havens, few locals 
were willing to cooperate with the coalition troops so intelligence was very difficult to 
obtain. Tactical information was easy for the Sadrists to get because of the rampant 
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corruption and the number of ordinary civilians willing to act as lookouts for the 
insurgent fighters. Muqtada al-Sadr gave the Sadrists great hope that they will one day 
defeat the United States and send them back home. At a time when citizens were 
experiencing violence everyday, it became socially acceptable to fight the U.S. troops 
and for Shia to fight Sunni. Since the Sadrists meet each of the terrorist’s needs, it will be 
very difficult to defeat them.  
Heymann outlined five state preventive strategies: reducing enthusiasm for 
attacks; deterrence through law enforcement, military, or economic threats; denying 
access to targets, resources; gathering and processing information (intelligence) on 
individuals, groups, organizations, and activities; disruption including covert operations, 
asset forfeiture, and incapacitation.117 Just as with the terrorist’s needs, this is a very 
diverse and difficult list of actions to achieve. Heymann does not examine how terrorist 
groups end but the lists above give a great starting point. Many of the actions listed above 
would certainly work in Iraq against al-Sadr and the United States has instituted many of 
them albeit with some failure. As the United States continues to withdraw troops and pull 
back their bases, they have denied access. The United States has been gathering and 
disseminating information since before the conflict began but many mistakes have been 
made with old intelligence or even wrong intelligence, which works against them as 
innocent civilians are either arrested or killed. Deterrence has been increasing as the Iraqi 
security forces are taking over at checkpoints and conducting patrols but with an increase 
in attacks on Shia civilians in April and May that have taken the lives of over 150 
innocent people, they are actually strengthening support for Muqtada al-Sadr as the 
people seek security.  
A renowned writer who has published numerous books about terrorism, Audrey 
Kurth Cronin has examined how terrorist campaigns have ended. She described six 
pathways: decapitation, basically arresting or killing the movements figure head, i.e., 
Muqtada al-Sadr; repression, aggressive military campaigns or domestic crackdowns; 
success, the terrorist group achieves their intended goals; negotiated settlement, the group  
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becomes a legitimate political group (the area focused upon), implosion, the group loses 
the support network and implodes; reorient, groups shift focus from political targets to 
criminal activity (something that has been seen within the Sadr organization).  
The RAND article is very similar to the assessments Cronin described. The five 
ways RAND outlined were military force, which coincides with repression above; 
policing which Cronin also included in repression; splintering, the groups split and join 
other established organizations, which is an area Cronin did not examine; and the final 
two are victory and politics, which match directly with what Cronin described. The 
RAND Corporation separated military force and policing into two separate paths to end 
terrorism because they found that military force rarely ends terrorism while policing has 
been the most effective to end groups unable to make a transition to nonviolence on their 
own.  
Cronin states that the first pathway to kill or capture the leader of the group does 
not always end the group but examples of groups exist that have rallied around the leader, 
which have collapsed. If a group is more organized and not focused around the leader, it 
is less likely to collapse with the arrest or death of the leader. Cronin states that 
considerable evidence is available that capturing a leader is more effective at ending the 
group than killing the leader.118 If Muqtada al-Sadr were to be assassinated by either the 
U.S. troops or Iraqi troops, then the Sadr II Movement would most certainly be reignited 
and be more deadly than in the past. Al-Sadr’s father and father-in-law were both 
martyred under the order of government, and if Muqtada were to suffer the same fate, the 
movement would not die. Many supporters would step forward to ensure al-Sadr is 
martyred and his movement continues. His death would be especially devastating 
regionally as he has gained support from Iran, and after the recent visit to Turkey, he has 
become a regional actor.  
The second pathway, repression, has been successful in the past but there are also 
examples of when it has and continues to fail: Israel against the Palestinians, the United 
States against al-Qaeda and Russia crushing Chechnya. Repression is also very costly not 
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just in monetary terms but in lives lost.119 The cost of human life in Iraq through large 
military campaigns against al-Sadr has already been seen. Separating the military and 
police actions under this heading of repression as RAND did is the best approach. 
Military action is normally large-scale and crude in tactics not to mention a foreign force 
does not take the time to get to know the locals and has no intention of staying long term 
through reconstruction so they will not gain the trust and support of the locals. Therefore, 
a police force is the best way to end terrorism. It comes from the local population so that 
it can empathize with them and because it has a similar demographic with the same 
beliefs, and thus, the civilians are more likely to confide in it and pass along intelligence 
that could lead to the arrest of terrorist members or possibly prevent an attack. In Iraq, as 
more and more civilians lost their lives because of the indiscriminate fire, support for the 
United States diminished while support for the enemy strengthened. History has already 
shown that trying to defeat al-Sadr using violence does not work; he simply calls a 
ceasefire and regroups or he calls for his movement to resort to different tactics such as 
using IED’s or mortar attacks. Since his militiamen can so easily blend into the 
surrounding environment, it is very difficult to capture or kill them. The author, for the 
aforementioned reason, thinks repression is not the way to demilitarize al-Sadr as 
violence begets violence.  
The next two pathways apply to al-Sadr and these will be most successful in 
demilitarizing him. Terrorism ending as a result of successfully achieving their objective 
and moving towards a legitimate political process are similarly successful in the case of 
al-Sadr. Since the outset of the conflict, al-Sadr has called for the United States to leave 
the country and let them rebuild. As the United States prepares to withdraw troops, al-
Sadr could view it as a success. He has already been involved in the political process in 
Iraq and has traveled to neighboring countries trying to gain support for the new Iraq. Al-
Sadr is becoming a more legitimate political figure and has been gaining regional 
support. It is important that the Iraqi government utilize the support he is gaining and the 
United States must also acknowledge that he is legitimizing and becoming an important 
resource for Iraq. The United States must put the battles of Najaf and the violence caused 
 
119 Cronin, Ending Terrorism: A Strategy for Defeating Al Qaeda, 32-33.  
 43
                                                
at the hands of his men behind them. It was war and al-Sadr did not act any different than 
Americans would against an occupying force in its own country. He seems genuine in his 
nationalistic beliefs and has made great strides towards peace in Iraq.   
The final two pathways from above are unlike to occur. Al-Sadr has made such a 
name for himself and has worked to reduce his movement to a core of individuals and a 
small core militia that the likelihood of his movement imploding, especially given the 
approaching U.S. withdrawal, is not likely to occur. The final pathway, moving towards 
other malignant forms will not occur under al-Sadr’s order. Members of his militia had 
turned to crime and were either killed, arrested, or stricken of al-Sadr’s support. Al-Sadr 
knows how important it is to take care of the Shia because they are his support-base and 
it would be foolish to allow them to be robbed and killed in his name.   
For the purposes of this thesis, the author examined Muqtada al-Sadr as a terrorist 
and the leader of a powerful insurgency. According to RAND, an insurgency is defined 
as “an internal conflict in which (1) a group or groups are trying to overthrow the 
government or secede from it, (2) more than 1,000 have died over the course of the war, 
and (3) more than 100 have died on each side.”120 The author does not believe anyone 
would argue that al-Sadr’s militia has been fighting an insurgent war since the first U.S. 
opposition in Najaf in 2004. When the militiamen were able to hold off the U.S. forces, it 
instilled a sense of power within the men and their opposition to the United States 
increased.  
B.  IS MUQTADA AL-SADR A TERRORIST?  
Muqtada al-Sadr has been labeled a terrorist by many coalition leaders and in 
many newspapers and articles in the last six years. His militia, the Mahdi Army, was at 
the forefront of the confrontation with coalition forces since the outset of the conflict. As 
a terrorist, how can al-Sadr be demilitarized and stop the insurgency by his army? What 
must first be determined is whether al-Sadr is in fact a terrorist or simply the leader of a 
group of thugs? As stated above, the author believes that al-Sadr’s organization is largely 
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an insurgent group that uses terrorist techniques to achieve its political goals. The use of 
indiscriminant weapons has incited fear into the public and has resulted in thousands of 
people fleeing their homes in search of safer cities. Much of the fear felt by the locals was 
due to the heavy fighting between his army and coalition troops that resulted in thousands 
of innocent lives being lost. In the past, he has used his army as a leveraging tool to try to 
coerce the government to change policy in his favor. This is clearly a terrorist technique 
and one that has been used by terrorist organizations for thousands of years. Al-Sadr 
never tried to hide his feelings about the American forces as an occupying force that 
should leave immediately and his army has thus clashed with the troops many times as a 
result. He has also had harsh feelings towards any group or persons who have cooperated 
with the coalition forces and intra-Shia fighting was not uncommon.   
As an insurgency, al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army in the beginning were a 
disorganized group of poor Shia who wanted to feel a part of the opposition to the 
coalition forces. As the army engaged in more conflict, they became more structured but 
as the war wore on, they became less interested in fighting the coalition forces and more 
interested in corrupting the locals. Many of the Mahdi Army members extorted funds 
from business owners for protection and sold fuel at incredibly inflated prices. Al-Sadr 
claimed that these men were not acting on his orders but were renegade bandits using his 
name to elicit fear and cooperation. As the insurgency continued, al-Sadr greatly 
influenced local police enabling his militia freedom of movement throughout the cities 
and they were able to transport weapons and place IED’s more easily.121 
Al-Sadr has also been referred to as a ‘kingmaker’ because of his influence in the 
political arena. In 2006, he was attributed with the selection of Ibrahim al-Jaafari as the 
interim prime minister.122 Although he was given the title as kingmaker, it was not 
necessarily a compliment because of the way he was able to ensure his selection. He 
made his demands with threats of violence if al-Jaafari was not selected and this was an 
example of the use of a terrorist threat to get what he wanted. At this time, he was first 
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beginning to become involved in Iraqi politics and was still very much involved in action 
against the coalition forces not to mention the country was still in turmoil and the 
government was still very disorganized.   
Even when al-Jaafari was voted out as the prime minister and Nuri al-Maliki was 
voted to replace him, al-Sadr gave his support, at least in the beginning. In 2007, al-Sadr 
became less supportive of al-Maliki in protest to his hesitance to eject the U.S. military 
from Iraq.123 Even though Al-Sadr was not aligned with al-Maliki at that point, and al-
Maliki had ordered the arrests of many of his militiamen and raided his strongholds in 
Basra and Amarah, al-Sadr showed restraint by not attempting to assassinate al-Maliki. 
The author believes al-Sadr realized that al-Maliki was the best leader for Iraq at the time 
and to kill him at that point would have been a huge setback for the country. Since the 
raids on his strongholds, the two have been in communication to reform the Shiite 
alliance.124 Al-Sadr has been very outspoken against al-Maliki and has contested many 
of the decisions he has made about the future of Iraq but has been quiet in the last year; a 
sign that he is becoming more supportive or it could be a quiet before the storm.  
Al-Sadr’s behavior and the silence from his organization in the last year could be 
a sign that his militia is regrouping or that al-Sadr is simply biding his time until the U.S. 
troops pull out of Iraq. His recent trip to Turkey is evidence that he is reaching out to gain 
support for his organization as well as Iraq. He is not acting out of selfishness; he is 
making great strides towards the good of Iraq. It is also proof that he is pursuing political 
interests and intends to be part of Iraqi politics in the future. The question is whether he 
will act within the law or will he threaten violence to ensure his wishes are made policy?  
Al-Sadr has gone to great lengths to ensure his militia remains out of the spotlight 
in Iraq. After the attacks targeting Shiites in April and May, the Mahdi Army has not 
retaliated nor is there any evidence that al-Sadr has given any order to avenge the deaths. 
It would appear that the ceasefire is continuing. The attacks could be a way for the 
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Sadrists to reemerge as security in predominantly Shiite areas continues to erode. After 
the bombing in Sadr City in April that killed approximately 40 people, some citizens 
wanted the Mahdi Army to resume security patrols and to take over the checkpoints as 
they feel the government security forces are too corrupt to ensure safety.125 
Al-Sadr’s militia has been very influential over the years. Much of their success 
has come from the assistance they have received from outside Iraq. Iran has been their 
largest contributor having given assistance in the form of money, munitions, training, and 
bomb making materials.126 The main focus of al-Sadr’s insurgency was to drive the 
occupying forces from their country and to attack any group that supported them. 
Muqtada al-Sadr and his army have acted no differently than many American citizens 
would if the United States were invaded by a force that wanted to change the 
government.   
Although the Mahdi Army appeared to be structured at first, it was in fact very 
disorganized and many who claimed to be acting on behalf of al-Sadr were actually 
simple criminals. As the months and years of fighting wore on, it became more and more 
apparent that the Mahdi Army was unstructured and instead it consisted of many small 
insurgent groups acting without higher order. Factions in outlying areas began to perform 
actions outside of the orders and policies set by al-Sadr. The criminal activity began to 
erode the support, and not just that the local militias received from the villages they once 
protected but overall support for al-Sadr. They became more like criminal gangs than a 
structured army.  
Whether one classifies the Sadrists as terrorists or insurgents, the steps to de-
militarize or to legitimize the organization are the same. Above, Muqtada al-Sadr is the 
main area of focus for disbanding the Mahdi Army. If al-Sadr becomes a legitimate 
political actor in Iraq, he will be forced to distance himself from any illegal activity. It 
could be argued that since he has been in politics since 2005, he has still been engaged in 
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radical activities. Although it is true that he has always been in close contact with his 
militia, which has also been engaged in anti-governmental activity, the author thinks it is 
due to the lack of direct inclusion by the Prime Minister and parliament in the political 
process that has given al-Sadr the excuse he needs to continue his violent behavior. The 
continued lack of social services, electricity, clean water, and in some areas, food have all 
been great concerns for al-Sadr, and until the resources are available to the poor Shia, he 
will continue to be antagonistic. Security is another concern for him especially since the 
recent attacks of April and May. If the government cannot provide better security to the 
Shia, and the citizens of those neighborhoods continue to request his assistance, his 
militia could be revived. Thus far, al-Sadr has continued to observe the 2007 ceasefire 
and has not given any indication he plans to absolve it; however, the government must 
continue efforts to secure and provide for the citizenship.  
Since the 2007 ceasefire went into effect, the violence experienced in Iraq has 
been at an all-time low. Al-Sadr has been in Qom, Iran continuing his studies to become 
an Ayatollah and has not been very involved in the politics of Iraq until recently when he 
visited Turkey. He has been working more towards resolving political issues legitimately 
through political means instead of through violence. The attacks in the last week of April 
2009 that killed more than 150 Shia were not avenged by al-Sadr even though many of 
his followers and some civilians felt that it was time for the Mahdi Army to reorganize to 
provide security.127 Much dissent exists among the Shia in the neighborhoods that were 
the targets of increased violence in April and May due to corruption within the security 
forces and not enough security personnel to secure Shia neighborhoods properly. “The 
Islamic State of Iraq, an umbrella insurgent group that includes Al Qaeda in 
Mesopotamia, [has claimed responsibility for the attacks] describ[ing] the recent attacks 
as part of a campaign called Harvest of the Good, which it announced in March 
[2009].”128 
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Muqtada al-Sadr has displayed incredible restraint as a result of the increased 
violence against Shia, a sign of his commitment to the ceasefire and displays a level of 
maturity that has not been witnessed since the conflict began. It is also a sign of the 
loyalty his followers have in him as they also resist retaliation. One question is whether 
he has actually changed or is he simply biding his time until the United States completely 
withdraws troops from Iraq?  
C.  HOW TO INTEGRATE AL-SADR INTO THE GOVERNMENT  
From 2003 to 2007, the Sadrists acted as a terrorist and insurgent group but 
recently al-Sadr has been moving away from the ideal that violence is the best way to 
achieve his political goals. He has become more involved in diplomacy even reaching out 
to neighboring countries for support as Iraq begins the long process of restructuring and 
stabilizing after six years of turmoil. He recently met with the Turkish president and 
prime minister in Turkey. Although he originated his trip from Iran, he was there to 
discuss the sovereignty of Iraq and future relations with Turkey to include the Shiites 
taking control of Kirkuk of which the Turks are in favor. Al-Sadr’s trip to Turkey was his 
first public appearance since June 2007, marking what could be a new era in which he 
becomes a more legitimate and diplomatic face of Iraq. The meeting was also a step 
towards legitimizing al-Sadr as he requested Turkey to play a larger role in the Middle 
East. As more countries in the region acknowledge al-Sadr as a legitimate figure, he 
prevents the Iraqi government and especially the American government from being able 
to arrest or assassinate him. His support continues to grow as he continues to try and 
legitimate himself within the government. As he continues to pursue his studies in Qom 
to become Ayatollah, he will also be viewed with more respect.   
Unless Iraq is stable and the government is functioning on its own, the United 
States cannot withdraw its forces, even with the new security pact in place. The author 
believes that if Iraq is still experiencing the violence it is today, the Iraqi government will 
request an extension to the 2011 deadline for U.S. forces to withdraw. If the United States 
withdraws too early, before Iraq is truly secure, then troops will likely be back in Iraq  
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within a decade, or worse yet, Iran will come to their rescue. To ensure a smooth 
transition, they must include al-Sadr in the turnover process, as much as the U.S. 
government is opposed to it, and they must appeal to certain demands.  
In a recent article in the Washington Post by Sudarsan Raghavan, he made clear 
that Muqtada al-Sadr is not going away and many of his followers remain loyal, although 
some are growing impatient with the ceasefire. Hazim al-Araji, Sadr’s top aide, was cited 
as saying that “Khazraji [Maj. Gen. Kareem al-Khazraji, commander of the 2nd Division 
of the national police in Kadhimiyah] and other commanders in Iraq’s security forces 
have exploited the lull in violence to detain hundreds of Sadr’s followers.”129 If the 
accusations are true then Iraq has a serious problem. If the Sadrists feel they are being 
targeted by the government they helped to shape, they could certainly retaliate with 
extreme violence. Since the ceasefire, the Sadrists and JAM have remained cooperative 
following the orders given by Muqtada al-Sadr to refrain from violence but many of them 
are becoming restless and the continued harassment from security forces could destroy 
the peace. For peace to continue, the Shiite political leaders must come together and this 
should include al-Sadr. He still maintains a large support network and retains a great deal 
of power and influence in Iraq.  
For the Iraqi Government to succeed, the UN must get involved with assistance 
from countries that the Iraqi government trusts such as neutral states that have not been 
involved in military action.130 The U.N. would have to be very careful not to appear as 
though they are trying to influence the politics in Iraq. They must remain in a support role 
acting as advisors when asked for assistance and give aid to the displaced personnel. The 
United States must understand that it will take time to stabilize Iraq and that the young 
democratic government may not be the model that the United States would like to see. 
Iraq is well on their way to becoming a stable country and the government is already 
proving they are prepared to and willing to act on their own without U.S. interference. 
The security pact was an example of their desire for independence and a huge step 
towards stability and international recognition as a democracy.  
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Al-Sadr has begun to take further steps to ensure his involvement in Iraq’s future 
by continuing his Islamic education. He had originally made the claim that he would 
become an Ayatollah by the year 2010, but the author believes that as he continues to 
work towards being viewed as a legitimate leader in Iraq, he will not rush his studies. The 
implications from al-Sadr’s achieving the second-highest clerical position in Shia religion 
are remarkable. He would be able to issue his own fatwa’s and train his clergy, which 
would also increase his legitimacy and increase his support.131 It will not be an easy 
achievement and if he rushes to complete the education, he would probably not be 
recognized by all other Ayatollah’s and Grand Ayatollah’s within the Shia community, 
especially within Iraq. Much of the recognition received by Ayatollah’s comes from the 
years of study, and if completed too quickly, it would be difficult for people to believe he 
has the wisdom that Ayatollahs acquire.   
The government of Iraq must understand that al-Sadr is not going away, and if he 
were to martyred, it would most certainly have a much worse result than if he were 
simply integrated into the political process. The Iraqi government must take a three-
pronged approach to integrating Muqtada al-Sadr into the political processes: economic, 
political, and military. The economic approach would include restructuring, welfare 
programs for poor citizens, and improving infrastructure. The programs would not be 
only for Shia but for all citizens of Iraq. Welfare programs are how al-Sadr was able to 
create such a large following in the first couple of years of the conflict. If the government 
were to take the programs under their control, they would lessen the need for al-Sadr’s 
welfare system. It would also be a good idea to place a Sadrist in charge of the welfare 
programs, which would prevent the Sadrists from retaliating against the government for 
taking the programs away. Rebuilding the infrastructure would assist in the prevention of 
crime and extortion by getting fuel prices under control and preventing the need for 
generators. The economic would fund the welfare programs such as, food, shelter, 
education, and employment. Militarily, the government must provide security to ensure 
safety in the pro-Sadr areas. If the government cannot provide security or it is deemed 
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that the security being provided is taking bribes to allow weapons and IED’s to pass 
checkpoints, then the Mahdi Army will be mobilized to ensure the safety of the citizens. 
Increasing the military would also include increasing police work although the two 
branches would operate independently. The military would work to secure borders and 
provide security around the cities while police would concentrate their efforts on 
establishing relationships with the population and to gather intelligence. The military 
would continue efforts to end the insurgency to include the dissolution of militia’s 
working instead of recruiting militiamen into the service.  
The government must be able to support the poor Shiite’s the same way al-Sadr 
has been able to do these last six years. As long as the poor Iraqis feel abandoned by their 
government, the more they are going to turn to powers that can support them. With the 
increased attacks on Shia in the last couple of months, people are looking again to the 
militias for security. The militias are succeeding in taking care of some of the basic 
human needs better than the government, and thus, they continue to gain support.132 If al-
Sadr is to be a legitimate actor in Iraq, the government must be able to provide the 
services that he has been so successful in providing. It would be prudent of al-Maliki to 
sit down with al-Sadr and request his assistance in implementing the policies and to 
oversee the employment of the services for Iraq’s poor to include Sunni.  
The government and the military in particular must focus on securing the cities 
and towns providing a safe place for its citizens to live and work and raise their children. 
There remains a threat from insurgents especially in the capital city and this violence 
continues to target Iraqi’s non-coalition forces. Until the IA forces are better trained and 
capable of planning large-scale operations, the civilians continue to rely on the militias in 
those areas where the insurgent violence is occurring. The militias have created an 
information network in these cities and towns and are more capable of tracking down and 
targeting the insurgents. They have as much to gain as the government because like the 
citizens, they are trying to protect themselves and also live in the cities.  
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Politics overrides each of the previous two in that no action can be taken without 
a vote. There must be political oversight in all operations dealing with the economy and 
military operations. That being said, al-Sadr must be incorporated into politics and he 
must be consulted on matters that affect areas of which he has control. He should also be 
incorporated into the decision-making process concerning missions in the areas where he 
has loyal support.  
Not only does Muqtada al-Sadr still retain a great deal of support from within 
Iraq, he also receives support from Iran. Iran has played possum for the most part since 
before the war began and has played sides against one another. They support ISCI and 
Dawa as well as their militias and continue to give aid to al-Sadr. As long as ISCI and 
Dawa try to distance their groups from Iran and al-Sadr continues to receive support, it 
could cause greater damage to the still fragile Iraqi government. This is just another 
reason for the Sadrists to be brought back into politics and given political power.133 
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V.  CONCLUSION  
Muqtada al-Sadr emerged as a radical leader shortly before the United States 
invaded Iraq foreseeing an opportunity to revive his father’s movement that started in 
1992. Al-Sadr was a part of his father’s movement, and when his father and two eldest 
brothers were assassinated, he took the movement underground. Many of the principles 
al-Sadr believes in and has executed since April 2003 come from his father. He was able 
to amass a large following because he anticipated the need for spiritual guidance and the 
lack of basic needs that would occur as the invasion progressed. He ordered his loyal 
followers into areas that housed the poorest Shia to create a large support base. This was 
a very strategic move on his part because he was able to get the jump on his rivals, the 
ISCI, Dawa, and Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani. He did not gain a lot of popularity with the 
wealthier Shia but he did become very popular with the poor, at least in the first couple of 
years.  
Al-Sadr comes from a very well respected family. As a result of the success of his 
father and cousin as leaders of the Shia, the name al-Sadr had become associated with 
rebellion and influence making his rise less difficult. His father and cousin were both 
martyred at the height of their power, which increased their popularity with the Shia and 
their followings grew even in death. When al-Sadr emerged, he had everything going for 
him to succeed; he had the name, religious credentials, and he had a cause against which 
to rise. The removal of Saddam Hussein left a void and al-Sadr was ready to fill it.   
He studied his father and cousin while under house arrest from 1999 to 2003 and 
when he emerged, he was prepared to continue the movement his father had started by 
reinstituting and enforcing the fatwa issued by his father. He rallied the poor Shi’a to take 
up resistance to the recently toppled Baath regime and made a name for himself 
immediately as a person to be feared. He was relentless in his pursuit as the new leader of 
the Shi’a community. Like his father, he was not interested in politics at the outset of the 
conflict but as it progressed and violence was not achieving his objectives, he realized  
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that politics was the new way of doing business in Iraq. His transition to politics 
resembled the movement his cousin had started, and thus far, he seems to be more 
successful.  
Unlike his father, he did not have a clear plan and many of the wealthier Shia did 
not feel he had the credentials required to lead their community. He thought he could take 
control of the country and force the United States out without having to cooperate with 
them. This led to increased violence and unrest throughout the country. The citizens of 
the most violent areas began to flee and denounce the Sadrists. Had Muqtada al-Sadr 
emerged from house arrest with the intention to engage the United States diplomatically 
and to assist in the security of the country, he could very well have become the face of 
Iraq.  
The best strategy to demilitarize Muqtada al-Sadr is to include him more in the 
political process. He has made it clear that he intends on being part of politics in Iraq as 
he has traveled to other countries in the region and met with those countries’ leaders to 
discuss the future of Iraq and their role. There are steps that must be taken to ensure he 
maintains his legitimacy and not resume his militaristic campaigns against the 
government. Al-Sadr must believe the government is doing all that it can to ensure the 
poor Shia that he has represented since 2003 will be cared for and are a priority for the 
government. They must provide welfare services, security, and infrastructure that al-Sadr 
has been providing in the past. By appointing a Sadrist to oversee the operations of those 
programs and by seeking advice from al-Sadr on the matters would go along way in 
legitimizing him. The government also must ensure all militias are dissolved in Iraq to 
include the Badr Organization, the Sons of Iraq, along with the Mahdi Army. If there 
were an overarching policy for all militias, then al-Sadr would be more inclined to 
support the dissolution of his militia without protest. Al-Sadr is a complicated individual 
who has not always been consistent in his rhetoric but it is the author’s belief that he truly 
does want a united Iraq.  
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